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Abstract. This paper presents research results that develop a dynamic
logic for reasoning about safety-critical information flow among humans
and computers. The logic advances previous efforts to develop logics of
agent knowledge, which make assumptions that are too strong for real-
istic human agents. We introduce Dynamic Agent Safety Logic (DASL),
based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), with extensions to account
for safe actions, belief, and the logical relationships among knowledge,
belief, and safe action. With this logic we can infer which safety-critical
information a pilot is missing when executing an unsafe action. We apply
the logic to the Air France 447 incident as a case study and provide a
mechanization of the case study in the Coq proof assistant.
1 Introduction
A common theme for aviation mishaps attributed to human error is for a pilot
to become overwhelmed by data, lose situational awareness, and provide unsafe
inputs to the flight controls. As yet, little work has been done to leverage the
power of formal methods to address this problem. This paper remedies that by
defining a dynamic logic of belief, knowledge, and safe action. We use the logic to
create an axiomatic model of agency suitable for reasoning about safety-critical
information flow among pilots and the flight computer. We mechanize this model
in the Coq Proof Assistant and apply it to the Air France 447 incident as a case
study.12
The research contributions of this paper include the development of a dy-
namic logic that is suitable for reasoning about safety-critical information flow.
The dynamic logic is extended beyond most dynamic logics’ treatment of action
in that it treats both mere action and safe action, and captures the relationship
between the two. The subsequent application and mechanization in Coq explore
novel uses of formal methods in aviation safety, beyond mere verification of sys-
tem component correctness. They introduce the idea of formally analyzing the
human component of the safety-critical systems.
1 This is a pre-print of an article published in 9th International Symposium,
NASA Formal Methods 17. The final authenticated version is available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57288-8 25.
2 Code: https://github.com/sethahrenbach/DASL/blob/master/DASL.v
2Dynamic Logic is a type of modal logic used for reasoning about state tran-
sition diagrams of programs [8,3]. A diagram consists of nodes and edges, repre-
senting states of the system and labeled transitions between them, respectively.
It is distinguished from other logics by the fact that truth is dynamic, rather
than static, in its semantics. Thus, it is capable of representing the way actions
change the truth of propositions. It serves as a foundation for a variety of logics
similarly concerned with changes in some aspect of the truth as a result of ac-
tions. This family of logics has been described as logical dynamics, and includes
Public Announcement Logic (PAL) and Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) [5].
Logical dynamics allows researchers to model information flow, rationality,
and action in multi-agent systems [5]. In Ahrenbach and Goodloe [1], the authors
develop a static modal logic for knowledge, belief, and safety to analyze a family
of aviation mishaps involving a type of reasoning error suffered by a single pilot.
This paper extends that work by employing dynamic methodologies from logical
dynamics to the analysis of mishaps. The use of a dynamic logic rather than
a static logic connects safety-critical information and actions in a more natural
way, and allows for easier inference from action to information. The application
of these methods advances the discipline of logical dynamics by employing them
in the real world, beyond toy examples and logic puzzles, and likewise improves
the discipline of aviation safety by introducing a formal method suitable for
analyzing safety-critical information flow between pilots and machine.
Recent work at the intersection of game theory and logical dynamics focuses
on information flow during games. Van Ditmarsch identifies a class of games
called knowledge games, in which players have diverging information[6]. This
slightly relaxes the assumption of classical game theory that players have com-
mon knowledge about each other’s perfect information. This invites logicians
to study the information conveyed by the fact that an action is executed. For
example, if agent 1 asks agent 2 the question, “p?”, the information conveyed is
that 1 does not know whether p, believes that 2 knows whether p, and after the
action occurs, this information becomes publicly known. Many actions convey
such information, beyond mere speech acts. For example, when a pilot provides
flight control inputs, her action conveys information about what she believes
about the aircraft’s state, namely that it is in a state that safely permits those
inputs. Anyone observing her inputs, like the first officer or the flight computer,
can make such inferences about her mental picture based on her actions.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we define the formal model,
which consists of a set of axioms in a dynamic modal logic for reasoning about
pilot knowledge, belief, and safety. Section 3 mechanizes the model in the Coq
Proof Assistant and applies it to case studies, illustrating the logic’s use as a
formal method for aviation safety. We offer a brief discussion of future work in
Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
32 Dynamic Agent Safety Logic
The logic for reasoning about information flow in knowledge games is called
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL). As its name suggests, it combines elements of
epistemic logic and dynamic logic. Epistemic logic is the static logic for reasoning
about knowledge, and dynamic logic is used to reason about actions. In dynamic
logic semantics, nodes are states of the system or the world, and relations on
nodes are transitions via programs or actions from node to node. If we think
of each node in dynamic logic as being a model of epistemic logic, then actions
become relations on models, representing transitions from one multi-agent epis-
temic model to another. For example, if we have a static epistemic model M1
representing the knowledge states of agents 1 and 2 at a moment, then the action
“p?” is a relation between M1 and M2, a new static epistemic model of 1’s and
2’s knowledge after the question is asked. All of this is captured by DEL.
We are concerned with an additional element: the safety status of an action,
and an agent’s knowledge and belief about that. To capture this, we extend DEL
and call the new logic Dynamic Agent Safety Logic (DASL). The remainder of
this section presents DASL’s syntax, semantics, and proves its soundness.
2.1 Syntax and Semantics
The Dynamic Agent Safety Logic (DASL) used in this paper has the following
syntax.
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Ki ϕ | Bi ϕ | [i, (A, a)]ϕ | [i, (A, a),S]ϕ,
where p ∈ AtProp is an atomic proposition, i refers to i ∈ Agents, a is the
name of an action, called an action token, belong to a set of such tokens, Actions,
and A refers to an action structure. The knowledge operator Ki indicates that
“agent i knows that ...” Similarly, the operator for belief,Bi can be read, “agent i
believes that...” The notion of action tokens and structures will be defined in the
semantics. The operators [i, (A, a)] and [i, (A, a),S] are the dynamic operators
for agent i executing action token a from action structure A in the former case,
and doing so safely in the latter case. Note that the S in [i, (A, a),S] stands for
‘safety’, and is not a variable, whereas the i, (A, a) are variables for agents, action
structures, and action tokens, respectively. One can read the action operators as
“after i executes a from A, ϕ holds.’ We define the dual modal operators 〈Ki〉 ,
〈Bi〉 , 〈i, (A, a)〉 , and 〈i, (A, a),S〉 in the usual way.
The semantics of DASL involve two structures that are defined simultane-
ously, one for epistemic models, and one for action structures capturing the
transition relation among epistemic models. Additionally, we define numerous
helper functions that straddle the division between metalanguage and object
language.
4Kripke Model A Kripke model M ∈ Model is a tuple 〈W, {Ri
k
}, {Ri
b
}, w, V 〉.
It is a set of worlds, sets of epistemic and doxastic relations on worlds for agents,
a world denoting the actual world, and a valuation function V mapping atomic
propositions to the set of worlds satisfying them. Most readers will be somewhat
familiar with epistemic logic, the logic for reasoning about knowledge. Doxastic
logic is a similar logic for reasoning about belief[9].
Action Structure An action structure A ∈ ActionStruct is a tuple 〈Actions,
{χi
k
}, {χi
b
}, a〉. It is a set of action tokens, sets of epistemic and doxastic relations
on action tokens for agents, and an action token, a, denoting an actual action
token executed.
An action structure captures the associated subjective events of an action
occurring, including how it is observed by various agents, incorporating their
uncertainty. The action tokens are the actual objective events that might occur.
For example, if I am handed a piece of paper telling me who won the Oscar for
Best Actress, and I read it, and you see me read it, then the action structure will
include possible tokens in which I read that each nominee has won, and you will
consider each of these tokens to be possible. When I read the paper, I consider
only one action token to be the one executed. This action structure represents
that transition from one epistemic model, in which both of us considers all
nominees the potential winner, to an epistemic model in which I know the winner
and you still do not know the winner. We can think of the action structure A
as the general action “Agent 1 reads the piece of paper” and the tokens as the
specific actions “Agent 1 reads that nominee n has won the award.”
Model Relation Just as Ri
k
denotes a relation on worlds, Ji, (A, a)K denotes
a relation on Kripke model-world pairs. It represents the relation that holds
betweenM,w andM ′, w′ when agent i executes action (A, a) atM,w and causes
the world to transition to M ′, w′.
Precondition Function The Precondition function, pre :: Actions 7→ ϕ, maps
an action to the formula capturing the conditions under which the action can
occur. For example, if we assume agents tell the truth, then an announcement
action has as a precondition that the announced proposition is true, as with
regular Public Announcement Logic.
Postcondition Function The Postcondition function, post :: A × AtProp 7→
AtProp, takes an action structure and an atomic proposition, and maps to the
corresponding atomic proposition after the action occurs.
post(A, p) = p if update(M,A,w, a, i) |= p, else ¬p.
Update Function The Update function, update :: (Model × ActionStruct ×
W × Actions × Agents) 7→ (Model × W ), takes a Kripke model M , an ac-
tion structure A, a world from the Kripke model, an action token from the
5Action structure, and an agent executing the action, and returns a new Kripke
model-world pair. It represents the effect actions have on models, and is more
complicated than other DEL semantics in that actions can change the facts
on the ground in addition to the knowledge and belief relations. It is a partial
function that is defined iff a model-world pair satisfies the action’s preconditions.
update(M,A,w, a, i) = (M ′, w′) where :
1. M = 〈W, {Ri
k
}, {Ri
b
}, w, V 〉
2. A = 〈Actions, {χi
k
}, {χi
b
}, a, pre, post〉
3. M ′ = 〈W ′, {R′i
k
}, {R′i
b
}, w′, V ′〉
4. W ′ = {(w, a)|w ∈W,a ∈ Actions, and w |= pre(a)}
5. R′i
k
= {((w, a), (v, b))|wRi
k
v and aχi
k
b}
6. R′i
b
= {((w, a), (v, b))|wRi
b
v and aχi
b
b}
7. w′ = (w, a)
8. V ′(p) = post(A, p)
Safety Precondition Function The Safety Precondition Function, pres ::
Actions 7→ ϕ, is a more restrictive function than pre. Where pre returns the
conditions that dictate whether the action is possible, pres returns the conditions
that dictate whether the action is safely permissible. This function is the key
reason the dynamic approach allows for easy inference from action to safety-
critical information.
The logic DASL has the following Kripke semantics.
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= Ki ϕ iff ∀v, wR
i
kv implies M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= Bi ϕ iff ∀v, wR
i
bv implies M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= [i, (A, a)]ϕ iff ∀M ′, w′, (M,w)Ji, (A, a)K(M ′, w′)
implies M ′, w′ |= ϕ
M,w |= [i, (A, a),S]ϕ iff ∀M ′, w′, (M,w)Ji, (A, a), SK(M ′, w′)
implies M ′, w′ |= ϕ
The definitions of the dynamic modalities make use of a relation between two
model-world pairs, which we now define.
6(M,w)Ji, (A, a)K(M ′, w′) iff M,w |= pre(a)
and update(M,A,w, a, i) = (M ′, w′)
(M,w)Ji, (A, a), SK(M ′, w′) iff M,w |= pres(a)
and update(M,A,w, a, i) = (M ′, w′)
2.2 Hilbert System
DASL is axiomatized by the following Hilbert system.
All propositional tautologies are axioms.
Ki is T (knowledge relation is reflexive)
Bi is KD45 (belief relation is serial, transitive, and Euclidean)
EP1: Ki ϕ ⇒ Bi ϕ
EP2: Bi ϕ ⇒ Bi Ki ϕ
EP3: Bi ϕ ⇒ Ki Bi ϕ
SP: [i, (A, a)]ϕ ⇒ [i, (A, a),S]ϕ
PR: 〈i, (A, a)〉ϕ ⇒ Bi 〈i, (A, a),S〉ϕ,
plus the inference rules Modus Ponens and Necessitation for Ki and Bi .
Above are the axioms characterizing the logic. Knowledge is weaker here than
in most epistemic logics, and belief is standard [7]. They are related logically by
EP(1-3), which hold that knowledge entails belief, belief entails that one believes
that one knows, and belief entails than one knows that one believes. Finally,
actions and safe actions are logically related by SP and PR, which hold that
necessary consequences of mere action are also necessary consequences of safe
actions, and that a pilot can execute an action only if he believes that he is
executing a safe action.
2.3 Soundness
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Dynamic Agent Safety Logic is sound for
Kripke structures with
(1) reflexive Ri
k
relations,
(2) serial, transitive, Euclidean Ri
b
relations,
(3) which are partially ordered (Ri
k
◦ Ri
b
) ⊆ Ri
b
, (Ri
b
◦ Ri
k
) ⊆ Ri
b
, and
Ri
b
⊆ Ri
k
,
(4) Ji, (A, a), SK ⊆ Ji, (A, a)Kand
(5) (Ji, (A, a), SK ◦Ri
b
) ⊆ Ji, (A, a)K.
7Proof . (1) and (2) correspond to the axioms that Ki is a T modality and
Bi is a KD45 modality in the usual way. (3) corresponds to EP1, EP2, and EP3.
Axioms AP through SB are reduction axioms. This leaves (4), corresponding to
SP, and (5) which corresponds to PR. Here we will prove (5). LetM be a Kripke
structure satisfying the five conditions above. Let A be an Action structure with
a and i as its actual action token and agent.
We prove (5) via the contrapositive of PR: 〈Bi〉 [i, (A, a),S]ϕ ⇒ [i, (A, a)]ϕ.
Assume M,w |= 〈Bi〉 [i.(A, a),S]ϕ. By the semantics of 〈Bi〉 , there exists a
v, such that wRi
b
v and v |= [i, (A, a),S]ϕ. From the semantics, it follows that
forall M ′, v′, if (M, v)Ji, (A, a), SK(M ′, v′) then M ′, v′ |= ϕ. By slightly abusing
the notation, and letting (W,w)Ri
b
(W, v) be equivalent to wRi
b
v, we can cre-
ate the composed relation (Ji, (A, a), SK ◦ Ri
b
). It then holds, by condition (5),
that (M,w)(Ji, (A, a), SK ◦ Ri
b
)(M ′, v′) implies (M,w)Ji, (A, a)K(M ′, v′). So, for
all M ′, v′, if (M,w)Ji, (A, a)K(M ′, v′), then M ′, v′ |= ϕ. So, M,w |= [i, (A, a)]ϕ.

3 Case Study and Mechanization
We apply the logic just developed to the formal analysis of the Air France 447
aviation incident. We also mechanize the formalization in the Coq Proof Assis-
tant. Our mechanization follows similar work by Malikovic´ and Cˇubrilo [12,13],
in which they mechanize an analysis of the game of Cluedo using Dynamic
Epistemic Logic, based on van Ditmarsch’s formalization of the game [6]. It is
commonly assumed that games must be adversarial, but this is not the case.
Games need only involve situations in which players’ payoffs depend on the ac-
tions of other players. Similarly, knowledge games need not be adversarial, and
must only involve diverging information. Thus, it is appropriate to model avi-
ation incidents as knowledge games of sorts, where players’ payoffs depend on
what others do, specifically the way the players communicate information with
each other. The goal is to achieve an accurate situational awareness and provide
flight control inputs appropriate for the situation. Failures to achieve this goal
result in disaster, and often result from imperfect information flow. A formal
model of information flow in these situations provides insight and allows for the
application of formal methods to improve information flow during emergency
situations.
3.1 Air France 447
This case study is based on the authoritative investigative report into Air France
447 performed and released by France’s Bureau d’Enqueˆtes et d’Analyses pour
la Se´curite´ de l’Aviation Civile (BEA), responsible for investigating civil aviation
incidents and issuing factual findings[4]. The case is mechanized by instantiating,
in Coq, the above logic to reflect the facts of the case. One challenge associated
with this is that the readings about inputs present in aviation are often real
8values on a continuum, whereas for our purposes we require discrete values. We
accomplish this by dividing the continuum associated with inputs and readings
into discrete chunks, similar to how fuzzy logic maps defines predicates with real
values[10].
This paper will formalize an excerpted instance from the beginning of the
case, involving an initial inconsistency among airspeed indicators, and the subse-
quent dangerous input provided by the pilot. Formalized in the logic, the facts of
the case allow us to infer that the pilot lacked negative introspection about the
safety-critical data required for his action. This demonstrates that the logic al-
lows information about the pilot’s situational awareness to flow to the computer,
via the pilot’s actions. It likewise establishes a safety property to be enforced by
the computer, namely that a pilot should maintain negative introspection about
safety-critical data, and if he fails to do so, it should be re-established as quickly
as possible.
According to the official report, at 2 hours and 10 minutes into the flight, a
Pitot probe likely became clogged by ice, resulting in an inconsistency between
airspeed indicators, and the autopilot disconnecting. This resulted in a change
of mode from Normal Law to Alternate Law 2, in which certain stall and control
protections ceased to exist. The pilot then made inappropriate control inputs,
namely aggressive nose up commands, the only explanation for which is that he
mistakenly believed that the aircraft was in Normal Law mode with protections
in place to prevent a stall. This situation, and the inference regarding the pilot’s
mistaken belief, is modeled in the following application and mechanization of
the logic.
3.2 Mechanization in Coq
The following mechanization demonstrates progress from the artificially simply
toy examples normally analyzed in the literature to richer real-world examples.
However, it does not represent the full richness of the approach. The actions
and instrument readings mechanized in this paper are constrained to those most
relevant to the case study. The approach is capable of capturing the full richness
of all instrument reading configurations and actions available to a pilot. To do so,
one needs to consult a flight safety manual and formally represent each action
available to a pilot, and each potential instrument reading, according to the
following scheme.
Before beginning, we note that our use of sets in the following Coq code re-
quires the following argument passed to coqtop before executing: -impredicative-
set. In CoqIDE, this can be done by selecting the ‘Tools’ dropdown, then ‘Coqtop
arguments’. Type in -impredicative-set.
We first formalize the set of agents.
Inductive Agents: Set := Pilot | CoPilot | AutoPilot.
9Next we formalize the set of available inputs. These themselves are not ac-
tions, but represent atomic propositions true or false of a configuration.
Inductive Inputs : Set :=
HardThrustPlus | ThrustPlus
| HardNoseUp | NoseUp
| HardWingLeft | WingLeft
| HardThrustMinus | ThrustMinus
| HardNoseDown | NoseDown
| HardWingRight | WingRight.
We represent readings by indicating which side of the panel they are on. Typ-
ically, an instrument has a left-side version, a right-side version, and sometimes a
middle version serving as backup. When one of these instruments conflicts with
its siblings, the autopilot will disconnect and give control to the pilot.
Inductive Side : Set := Left | Middle | Right.
We divide the main instruments into chunks of values they can take, in order
to provide them with a discrete representation in the logic. For example, the
reading VertUp1 may represent a nose up reading between 0◦ and 10◦, while
VertUp2 represents a reading between 11◦ and 20◦.
Inductive Readings (s : Side) : Set :=
VertUp1 | VertUp2 | VertUp3 | VertUp4
| VertDown1 | VertDown2 | VertDown3 | VertDown4
| VertLevel | HorLeft1 | HorLeft2 | HorLeft3
| HorRight1 | HorRight2 | HorRight3 | HorLevel
| AirspeedFast1 | AirspeedFast2 | AirspeedFast3
| AirspeedSlow1 | AirspeedSlow2 | AirspeedSlow3
| AirspeedCruise| AltCruise | AltClimb | AltDesc | AltLand.
We define a set of potential modes the aircraft can be in.
Inductive Mode : Set := Normal | Alternate1 | Alternate2.
We define a set of global instrument readings representing the mode and
all of the instrument readings, left, right, and middle, combined together. This
represents the configuration of the instumentation.
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Inductive GlobalReadings : Set := Global (m: Mode)
(rl : Readings Left)
(rm : Readings Middle)
(rr : Readings Right).
The set of atomic propositions we are concerned with are those representing
facts about the instrumentation.
Inductive Atoms : Set :=
| M (m : Mode)
| Input (a : Inputs)
| InstrumentL (r : Readings Left)
| InstrumentM (r : Readings Middle)
| InstrumentR (r : Readings Right)
| InstrumentsG (g : GlobalReadings).
Next we follow Malikovic´ and Cˇubrilo [12,13] in defining a set prop of proposi-
tions in predicate calculus, distinct from Coq’s built in type Prop. The definition
provides constructors for atomic propositions consisting of particular instrument
reading predicate statements, implications, propositions beginning with a knowl-
edge modality, and those beginning with a belief modality. Interestingly, modal
logic cannot be directly represented in Coq’s framework [11]. We first define
propositions in first-order logic, which we then use to define DASL. This ap-
pears to be the standard technique for mechanizing modal logics in Coq.
Inductive prop : Set :=
| atm : Atoms → prop
| imp: prop → prop → prop
| Forall : forall (A : Set), (A → prop) → prop
| K : Agents → prop → prop
| B : Agents → prop → prop
| Ck : list Agents → prop → prop
| Cb : list Agents → prop → prop.
We use the following notation for implication and universal quantification.
Infix "=⇒ " := imp (right associativity, at level 85).
Notation "\-/ p" := (Forall _ p) (at level 70, right associativity).
We likewise follow Malikovic´ and Cˇubrilo [12,13] by defining an inductive type
theorem representing a theorem of DASL. The constructors correspond to the
11
Hilbert system, either as characteristic axioms, or inference rules. The first three
represent axioms for propositional logic, then the rule Modus Ponens, then the
axioms for the epistemic operator plus its Necessitation rule, then the doxastic
operator and its Necessitation rule. Do not confuse the Necessitation rules with
material implication in the object language. The final constructors capture the
axioms relating belief and knowledge. The axioms for dynamic modal operators
are defined separately, and are not included here.
Inductive theorem : prop → Prop :=
| Hilbert_K: forall p q : prop, theorem (p =⇒ q =⇒ p)
| Hilbert_S: forall p q r : prop,
theorem ((p=⇒ q=⇒ r)=⇒ (p=⇒ q)=⇒ (p=⇒ r))
| Classic_NOTNOT : forall p : prop, theorem ((NOT (NOT p)) =⇒ p)
| MP : forall p q : prop, theorem (p =⇒ q) → theorem p → theorem q
| K_Nec : forall (a : Agents) (p : prop), theorem p → theorem (K a p)
| K_K : forall (a : Agents) (p q : prop),
theorem (K a p =⇒ K a (p =⇒ q) =⇒ K a q)
| K_T : forall (a : Agents) (p : prop), theorem (K a p =⇒ p)
| B_Nec : forall (a : Agents) (p : prop), theorem p → theorem (B a p)
| B_K : forall (a : Agents) (p q : prop),
theorem (B a p =⇒ B a (p =⇒ q) =⇒ B a q)
| B_Serial : forall (a : Agents) (p : prop),
theorem (B a p =⇒ NOT (B a (NOT p)))
| B_4 : forall (a : Agents) (p : prop), theorem (B a p =⇒ B a (B a p))
| B_5 : forall (a : Agents) (p : prop),
theorem (NOT (B a p) =⇒ B a (NOT (B a p)))
| K_B : forall (a : Agents) (p : prop), theorem (K a p =⇒ B a p)
| B_BK : forall (a : Agents) (p : prop), theorem (B a p =⇒ B a (K a p)).
We use the following notation for theorem:
Notation "|-- p" := (theorem p) (at level 80).
We encode actions as records in Coq, recording the acting pilot, the ob-
servability of the action (whether it is observed by other agents or not), the
input provided by the pilot, and the preconditions for the action and the safety
preconditions for the action, both represented as global atoms.
Record Action : Set := act {Ai : Agents; Aj : Agents; pi : PI;
input : Inputs; c : GlobalReadings;
c_s : GlobalReadings}.
The variable c holds the configuration representing the precondition for the
action, while the variable c s holds the configuration for the safety precondition.
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We encode the precondition and safety precondition functions as follows.
Function pre (a:Action) : prop := atm (InstrumentsG (c a)).
Function pre_s (a : Action) : prop := atm (InstrumentsG (c_s a)).
In the object language, the dynamic modalities of action and safe action are
encoded as follows.
Parameter aft_ex_act : Action → prop → prop.
Parameter aft_ex_act_s : Action → prop → prop.
Many standard properties of logic, like the simplification of conjunctions,
hypothetical syllogism, and contraposition, are encoded as Coq axioms. As an
example, here is how we encode simplifying a conjunction into just its left con-
junct.
Axiom simplifyL : forall p1 p2,
|−− p1 & p2 → |−− p1.
We formalize the configuration of the instruments at 2 hour 10 minutes into
the flight as follows.
Definition Config_1 := (atm (M Alternate2)) &
(atm (InstrumentL (AirspeedSlow3 Left))) &
(atm (InstrumentM (AirspeedSlow3 Middle))) &
(atm (InstrumentR (AirspeedCruise Right))).
The mode is Alternate Law 2, and the left and central backup instruments
falsely indicate that the airspeed is very slow, while the right side was not
recorded, but because there was a conflict, we assume it remained correctly
indicating a cruising airspeed.
The pilot’s dangerous input, a hard nose up command, is encoded as follows.
13
Definition Input1 := act Pilot Pilot Pri HardNoseUp
(Global Alternate2 (AirspeedSlow3 Left)
(AirspeedSlow3 Middle)
(AirspeedCruise Right))
(Global Normal (AirspeedCruise Left)
(AirspeedCruise Middle)
(AirspeedCruise Right)).
The action is represented in the object language by taking the dual of the dy-
namic modality, ¬[i, (A, a)]¬True, equivalently 〈i, (A, a)〉 True, indicating that
the precondition is satisfied and the action token is executed.
Definition Act_1 := NOT (aft_ex_act Input1 (NOT TRUE)).
The actual configuration satisfies the precondition for the action, but it is
inconsistent with the safety precondition. The safety precondition for the action
indicates that the mode should be Normal and the readings should consistently
indicate cruising airspeed. However, in Config 1, the conditions do not hold.
Thus, the action is unsafe. From the configuration and the action, DASL allows
us to deduce that the pilot lacks negative introspection of the action’s safety
preconditions.
Negative introspection is an agent’s awareness of the current unknowns. To
lack it is to be unaware of one’s unknown variables, so lacking negative introspec-
tion about one’s safety preconditions is to be unaware that they are unknown.
Theorem NegIntroFailMode :
|−− (Config_1 =⇒
Act_1 =⇒
((NOT (K Pilot (pre_s(Action1)))) &
(NOT (K Pilot (NOT (K Pilot (pre_s(Action1)))))))).
In fact, in general it holds that if the safety preconditions for an action are
false, and the pilot executes that action, then the pilot lacks negative introspec-
tion of those conditions. We have proven both the above theorem, and the more
general theorem, in Coq.
14
Theorem neg_intro_failure :
forall (A Ao : Agents) (pi : PI) (inp : Inputs)
(m : Mode)
(rl : Readings Left) (rm : Readings Middle) (rr : Readings Right)
(ms : Mode)
(rls : Readings Left) (rms : Readings Middle) (rrs : Readings Right)
phi,
|−− (NOT
(aft_ex_act
(act A Ao pi inp (Global m rl rm rr) (Global ms rls rms rrs))
(NOT phi)) =⇒
NOT (atm (InstrumentsG (Global ms rls rms rrs))) =⇒
(NOT (K A (atm (InstrumentsG (Global ms rls rms rrs)))) &
(NOT (K A (NOT (K A (atm (InstrumentsG (Global ms rls rms rrs))))))))).
This indicates that negative introspection about safety preconditions is a de-
sirable safety property to maintain, consistent with the official report’s criticism
that the Airbus cockpit system did not clearly display the safety critical informa-
tion. The logic described in this research accurately models the report’s findings
that the pilot’s lack of awareness about safety-critical information played a key
role in his decision to provide unsafe inputs. Furthermore, the logic supports ef-
forts to automatically infer which safety-critical information the pilot is unaware
of and effectively display it to him.
4 Additional Case Studies
To illustrate the flexibility of this approach, we now formalize additional case
studies in the logic. We begin with two additional aviation incidents, Copa Air-
lines flight 201 and Asiana Airlines flight 214, and then turn our attention to
the domains of emergency health care and powerplant operations.
We make use of the following lemma.
Bi ϕ ⇒ ¬Ki ¬ϕ. (1)
Proof . From the fact that the belief modality is serial, it holds that
Bi ϕ ⇒ 〈Bi〉ϕ,
which is equivalent to
Bi ϕ ⇒ ¬Bi ¬ϕ.
Due to axiom EP1, it follows that
Bi ϕ ⇒ ¬Ki ¬ϕ.

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4.1 Copa 201 and Asiana 214
Copa flight 201 departed Panama City, Panama for Cali, Colombia in June,
1992. Due to faulty wiring in the captain’s Attitude Indicator, he incorrectly
believed he was in a left bank position. In response to this, he directed the
plane into an 80 degree roll to the right, which caused the plane to enter a steep
dive. A correctly functioning backup indicator was available to the captain, and
investigators believe that the captain intended to direct the backup indicator’s
readings to his own, but due to an outdated training module, the flip he switched
actually sent his own faulty readings to the co-pilot’s indicator. Approximately
29 minutes after takeoff, the plane crashed into the jungle and all passengers and
crew perished. We formalize the moment at which the pilot provides the hard
right roll input.
1. (LeftAIHorLeft2 ) ∧ ¬(MiddleAIHorLeft2 ) . . .——————– configuration.
2. 〈pilot , hardwingright 〉 true———————————————— pilot input.
3. Bpilot (MiddleAIHorLeft2 )———————————— from axiom PR, pres .
4. ¬Kpilot (MiddleAIHorLeft2 )——————————- from axiom K-Reflexive.
5. Bpilot Kpilot (MiddleAIHorLeft2 )————————— from (3), axiom EP2.
6. ¬Kpilot ¬Kpilot (MiddleAIHorLeft2 )——————— from (5), B-Serial, EP1.
7. ¬Kpilot (MiddleAIHorLeft2 ) ∧ ¬Kpilot ¬Kpilot (MiddleAIHorLeft2 )– (4), (6).
8. ¬(¬Kpilot (MiddleAIHorLeft2 ) ⇒ Kpilot ¬Kpilot (MiddleAIHorLeft2 )) - (7).
Asiana flight 214 from South Korea to San Francisco departed in the evening
of July 6, 2013 and was schedule to land just before noon that morning. The
weather was good and air traffic control cleared the pilots to perform a visual
approach to the runway. The plane came in short and crashed against an em-
bankment in front of the runway, resulting in the deaths of three passengers and
187 injured. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation
found that the captain had mismanaged the approach and monitoring of the
airspeed, resulting in the plane being too high for a landing. Upon noticing this,
the captain selected a flight mode (flight level change speed) which unexpectedly
cause the plane to climb higher. In response to this, the captain disconnected
the autopilot and pulled back on the thrust. This caused an autothrottle (A/T)
protection to turn off, so when the captain pitched the nose down, the plane
descended fast than was safe, causing it to come down too quickly and collide
with the embankment in front of the runway. We will formalize the moment at
which the pilot pitches the nose down.
1. (A/T = Off ) ∧ (AirspeedSlow3 ) . . .—————————– configuration.
2. 〈pilot , hardthrustminus〉 true——————————————- pilot input.
3. Bpilot (A/T = On)—————————————— from axiom PR, pres .
4. ¬Kpilot (A/T = On)————————————- from axiom K-Reflexive.
5. Bpilot Kpilot (A/T = On)———————————– from (3), axiom EP2.
6. ¬Kpilot ¬Kpilot (A/T = On)————————— from (5), B-Serial, EP1.
7. ¬Kpilot (A/T = On) ∧ ¬Kpilot ¬Kpilot (A/T = On)—————- (4), (6).
8. ¬(¬Kpilot (A/T = On) ⇒ Kpilot ¬Kpilot (A/T = On)) —————— (7).
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The above formalizations follow the same format as that of Air France 447.
A pilot provides an input whose safety precondition conflicts with one of the
instruments in the configuration, and we infer that the pilot lacks negative in-
trospection of the safety precondition. This is distinct from but related to the
property that the pilots, in engaging in an unsafe action, are unaware of the
unsafe instrument readings. Thus, we describe our first safety properties.
1. Safety Negative Introspection (SNI). If a safety precondition does not hold,
then agent knows that he does not know it to hold.
¬pres (a) ⇒ Ki ¬Ki pres(a)
2. Unsafety Delivery (UD). If a safety precondition is false, then agent knows
that it is false.
¬pres (a) ⇒ Ki ¬pres (a)
Our above formalizations show that SNI is false when a pilot provides an
unsafe input. Notice that UD implies SNI.
Proof . It suffices to show that Ki ¬ϕ ⇒ Ki ¬Ki ϕ. Assume Ki ¬ϕ holds.
From EP1, it follows that Bi ¬ϕ, and because knowledge is a normal modality,
it follows that Ki Bi ¬ϕ holds. From lemma 1, and again the fact that knowledge
is normal modality, it follows that Ki ¬Ki ¬¬ϕ, or equivalently, that Ki ¬Ki ϕ.

However, the converse does not hold. We can satisfy SNI when the safety
precondition is false, the agent knows that he doesn’t know it, but doesn’t know
that it is false. A counterexample consists of a model with three worlds: {u,v}.
Let ϕ be the safety precondition, with the following truth assignment: {False,
True}. Let the epistemic relation include (u,v), (v,u), and the reflexive relations.
Then at world u ϕ is false, and Ki ¬Ki ϕ is true, but Ki ¬ϕ is false.
The formalization show that from the pilot’s unsafe action, it follows that he
lacks negative introspection of the safety precondition.
〈i, a〉 true ∧ ¬pres (a) ⇒ ¬Ki ¬Ki pres (a) (2)
This situation violates SNI, because the pilot doesn’t know that he doesn’t know
the safety precondition. Since UD implies SNI, UD is also violated.
〈i, a〉 true ∧ ¬pres (a) ⇒ ¬Ki ¬pres (a) (3)
So, from an unsafe action, we can also infer that the pilot does not know that
the safety precondition is false, a stronger conclusion.
Thus, by restoring knowledge that the safety precondition is false, it follows
that either the safety precondition is true, or the unsafe action is not executed.
Ki ¬pres (a) ⇒ ¬〈i, a〉 true ∨ pres (a) (4)
The pilot’s knowledge in the antecedent implies that the safety precondition is
false, so this simplifies to:
Ki ¬pres(a) ⇒ ¬〈i, a〉 true. (5)
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This squares with the standard game theoretic inference, wherein a ratio-
nal agent with knowledge of the situation executes a good action. Because our
model of knowledge and rationality is weaker, we make the weaker claim that a
minimally rational pilot with knowledge of the safety-critical information does
not execute a bad action.
5 Future Work
The case study presented in this paper is overly simplified due to space con-
straints. Future work will undertake the task of extending the approach to other
actions in the Air France 447 incident, and the safety-critical information ex-
pressed by them. For example, when both pilots provided conflicting inputs to
the aircraft, the computer could have inferred that neither was aware of the
other’s actions. This will illustrate the use of the approach in a multi-agent con-
text. Similarly, as recommended by an anonymous reviewer, we shall apply the
approach to other aviation mishaps involving complicated safety-critical infor-
mation flow, specifically Asiana Airlines Flight 214 [14].
An important extension of the foundational work provided by this paper
is the construction of a system that takes advantage of the logic as a runtime
safety monitor. It will monitor the pilot’s control inputs and current flight con-
figurations, and in the event that an action’s safety preconditions do not hold,
infer which instrument readings the pilot is unaware of and act to correct this.
In order to avoid further information overload, the corrective action taken by
the computer should be to temporarily remove or dim the non-safety-critical
information from competition for the pilot’s attention, until the pilot’s unsafe
control inputs are corrected, indicating awareness of the safety-critical informa-
tion. Construction of a prototype of this system is underway.
6 Conclusion
This paper has described Dynamic Agent Safety Logic (DASL), a logic for rea-
soning about safety-critical information flow. It formalized actions and knowl-
edge in the way common to Dynamic Epistemic Logic, but also formalized the
notion of safe actions and beliefs. Additionally, it formalized a more realistic
model of human reasoning, capturing a weaker notion of knowledge than most
epistemic logics, and modeled the logical relationship between knowledge and
belief. It formalized a realistic notion of rationality. The logic was mechanized
in the Coq proof assistant and applied to the case of Air France 447 to validate
its usefulness as a formal method for aviation safety.
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